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1 Introduction
To facilitate supervisory cooperation in response to the emergence of nancial
conglomerates, multinational nancial institutions and new nancial prod-
ucts, there has been an increasing trend in Europe to integrate nancial
supervision. This is exemplied by the tendency of various countries to de-
crease the number of authorities in charge of the supervision of banking,
insurance and securities business.1 By using the popularity of nancial con-
glomerates in Europe and, especially, in Scandinavia as a starting point,
this paper applies economic theory to analyze how the incentives of a nan-
cial supervisory authority to oversee nancial intermediaries depend on the
institutional structure of supervision as well as the type of nancial inter-
mediaries that exist on the market.2 In this paper, the supervisory e¤ort of
an authority is derived endogenously from the model so as to compare how
the supervisory incentives of an integrated supervisory authority di¤er from
those of sectorally separated supervisors when the nancial intermediaries to
be overseen can be either stand-alone institutions or nancial conglomerates
combining several nancial product lines (e.g., banking and insurance) under
a single roof.
To analyze these issues, I apply insights from monitoring in a bank-rm
1Finland has also followed this trend by combining two formerly separate agencies (the
Financial Supervision Authority and the Insurance Supervision Authority) so as to create
a single national authority responsible for the supervision of banking, securities business
and insurance.
2In terms of market shares in year 2001, nancial conglomerates held 57% of deposits
and 61% and 37% of premium income in the Finnish banking, life insurance and non-life
insurance markets, respectively (see Holopainen (2007)).
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relationship (e.g., Carletti (2004), Carletti et al. (2007), Cerasi and Daltung,
S. (2000)) to construct a simple one-period model inspired by Holmström
and Tirole (1997). A nancial intermediary has access to a risky project
for which it raises the funds from debt-holders. Instead of exerting e¤ort to
increase the success probability of the project, the intermediary may misbe-
have so as to enjoy a private benet. The intermediarys incentives to exert
e¤ort can be increased through costly monitoring by a supervisory authority.
Monitoring reduces the risk of intermediarys failure and, consequently, the
associated failure costs borne by the supervisor in form of fund insurance
payout and social bankruptcy costs. The supervisors monitoring incentives
depend not just on the institutional structure of supervision (integrated vs
decentralized) but also on the type of the nancial intermediary (stand-alone
vs conglomerate) as these factors together determine whether the supervi-
sory authority is the sole supervisor of the nancial intermediary or monitors
it together with another agency. In contrast to a sole supervisor, multiple
supervisors have the potential to benet from diseconomies of scale in moni-
toring but are also tempted to free-ride on the supervisory e¤ort of the other
agency. For this trade-o¤ to realise it does not however su¢ ce that the su-
pervision is decentralized but it also requires that the nancial intermediary
to be overseen is a nancial conglomerate instead of a stand-alone nancial
institution. Consequently, nancial conglomeration is equivalent to making
the supervisory incentives sensitive to the institutional structure of supervi-
sion. In case of a nancial conglomerate, decentralized supervision has then
the potential to be equally e¤ective as integrated supervision if the benets
from sectoral supervision in terms of the diseconomies of scale in monitoring
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can overcome its downsides in the form of the incentives of the supervisors
to free-ride on each others monitoring e¤ort.
The analysis of this framework delivers several result. First, the analy-
sis suggests that, even in the absence of conglomeration, measures like fund
insurance policies should be coordinated with the nature and the design of
the supervisory system. Otherwise, the nancial intermediaries may be un-
able to raise funding from the debt-holders. This threat is especially true in
environments characterized by high cost of monitoring (e.g., because of de-
ciencies in the regulatory and legal framework) since in these situations the
level of o¢ cial supervision will not necessarily be high enough to compensate
for ungenerous fund insurance in protecting the interests of the debt-holders.
As a result, the level of fund insurance becomes critical since a too low level
may threaten the ow of credit to and from nancial intermediaries.
Second, this paper shows that decentralized supervision can be as e¤ective
in supervision of nancial conglomerates as integrated supervision. However,
while integrated supervision is not necessary for the e¤ective supervision of
nancial conglomerates in all circumstances, it is at least as e¤ective in terms
of the monitoring intensities as decentralized supervision. Consequently, the
results are both supportive to the recent trend in Europe to replace sectoral
supervision with integrated supervision but also indicative of the possibility
that the two supervisory structures can coexist in di¤erent countries and be
equally e¤ective also in the supervision of nancial conglomerates.
Third, this paper illustrates that although decentralized supervision may
lead to a lower monitoring intensity that handicaps the nancial conglomer-
ate by lowering the success probability of the project and raising the interest
3
rate requirement by the debt-holders, the prots from nancial conglomer-
ation may still be higher under sectoral supervision especially if the private
benets are high. Consequently, the analysis suggests that nancial inter-
mediaries may be tempted to adopt the conglomerate form or, if already
operating as a nancial conglomerate, tempted to migrate to environments
that posit sectoral supervision so as to benet from the potentially less com-
prehensive supervision. This in turn has implications for the value of di¤erent
policy measures like the need to harmonize supervisory structures, the im-
portance of ensuring the competitiveness of the nancial sector as well as the
usefulness of limiting the corporate forms available for nancial intermedi-
aries.
The main insight of this paper is to analyze how the institutional struc-
ture of supervision interacts with the type of nancial intermediary in de-
termining the incentives of the nancial supervisor to monitor the nancial
intermediary and how these interactions translate into the price and avail-
ability of funding as well as the desire of nancial intermediaries to use the
conglomerate form so as to benet from a certain monitoring intensity. Since
the move towards integrated supervision is often justied by the expected
increase in the e¤ectiveness of supervision especially in case of nancial con-
glomerates, it is important to explicitly look at the supervisory incentives
to see whether (and under which conditions) this will happen. Understand-
ing the relative advantages of integrated and sectorally separated supervi-
sion is also important since, despite the tendency towards more integrated
supervision in Europe, the supervisory structures around the world do yet
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posit a great deal of heterogeneity.3 A more detailed knowledge of the su-
pervisory dynamics between separate supervisors is also justied since, in
addition to signicant cross-sectoral activities, large nancial conglomerates
(e.g., Nordea) often have extensive cross-border activities too which require
supervisory cooperation between di¤erent national authorities. As a result,
the supervisory interactions analyzed here could help to shed some light on
the supervisory challenges arising among competing national supervisors.
By analyzing the supervisory e¤ects of nancial conglomeration, I am
able to expand the existing regulatory literature on nancial conglomerates
that has concentrated on the capital regulation of these institutions. Both
Freixas et al. (2007) and Mälkönen (2009) illustrate a need for either higher
or lower capital requirements for nancial conglomerates arising either from
the problem of regulatory arbitrage or from the intensied competition in
the markets for nancial services. Neither of these papers however takes up
the issue of o¢ cial supervision of nancial conglomerates. In this respect,
this paper also departs from Boot and Schmeits (2000) and Dewatripont and
Mitchell (2005) who analyze the e¤ects of conglomeration on the incentives
of conglomerate divisions to take risk. Here the emphasis is on the e¤ects
of nancial conglomeration on the incentives of nancial supervisors to limit
risk through o¢ cial oversight.
In considering the strategic interaction between several supervisors, this
paper is also linked to the literature on the supervision of multinational
3For example, in the United States the supervisory system is still built upon the gen-
eral principle of sectorally separated supervision (for more on the di¤erences between the
European and the US approach, see Holopainen (2007)).
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banks. Closest in spirit is the paper by Holthausen and Rønde (2005) which
shows that a supranational authority can lead to improved decisions to close
a multinational bank especially when the interests of the national supervi-
sors are very divergent. They also demonstrate that a bank may allocate
its investments strategically across countries so as to escape closure. In a
similar vein, this paper highlights in context of nancial conglomerates that
integrated supervision can be superior to a more decentralized solution, and
that variance in the supervisory policies may be exploited by the nancial
intermediaries in search for certain monitoring intensity. However, in con-
trast to Holthausen and Rønde, I explicitly consider the incentives of the
supervisory authorities to gather costly monitoring information and show
how, in presence of not just banks but di¤erent types of nancial intermedi-
aries, these incentives depend on whether the supervisory authority is solely
responsible for the supervision or carries it out in cooperation with another
agency. As a result, the potential di¤erences in the supervisory policies are
derived here from the underlining di¤erences in the supervisory structures
and nancial institutions.4
Finally, by touching the issue of whether a more harmonized approached
should be taken with respect to nancial supervision, this paper is also re-
lated to DellAriccia and Marquez (2006) and, especially, Acharya (2003)
who analyze the need for more coordinated approach in bank regulation. In
spirit of their work, this paper also implies that lack of harmonization may
4In analyzing the question of how many supervisors to have, this paper is also connected
to that of Kahn and Santos (2005) on bank regulation. In their paper, Kahn and Santos
consider whether to keep the deposit insurance and lending of last resort functions separate,
and whether to allocate one of these authorities also the right to close banks down.
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lead to worsening of regulatory standards in terms of how comprehensively
nancial institutions are supervised.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic model in terms of a stand-alone nancial intermediary. Section 3
contains the main results concerning stand-alone intermediaries. Section 4
extends the analysis to cover nancial conglomerates under two alternative
supervisory structures. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in
the Appendix.
2 The basic model
Consider a two-date economy (t = 0; 1) with three types of risk-neutral
parties: a nancial intermediary, numerous debt-holders and a supervisory
authority. The nancial intermediary has access to a risky project requiring
an investment of one unit at date 0. The project generates a cash ow R if
it succeeds and 0 if it fails at date 1. The success probability of the project
depends on the behavior of the nancial intermediary: it is pL, if the inter-
mediary misbehaves and pH ; where pH > pL, if it behaves well. The interme-
diary may choose to misbehave in order to enjoy a non-transferable private
benet B. This can be interpreted as running unprotable pet projects or,
alternatively, as opportunity costs from managing projects diligently. There
is a moral hazard problem as the intermediarys behavior is not observable.
The nancial intermediary has no initial capital but raises funds from
debt-holders at a gross interest rate r. The debt-holders are (partially) pro-
tected by a fund insurance scheme securing fraction  2 [0; 1] of the debt-
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holdersfunds in case the intermediary fails. For simplicity, fund insurance
premium is taken to be zero.5 The debt-holders are willing to provide funds
as long as they expect to at least break-even; that is, if they expect a return
at least equal to the gross return y > 1 from an alternative (safe) investment.6
In what follows, I assume that the intermediarys project is creditworthy
only if the intermediary behaves; i.e.,
pHR > y > pLR: (A1)
As the expected cash ow of the intermediarys project is higher than the safe
return when the intermediary behaves and lower if it misbehaves, I sometimes
refer to the former type of project as the good project and the latter type as
the bad project.
Secondly, I assume that the private benet B is su¢ ciently high to induce
the nancial intermediary to misbehave even if the interest rate r is set at
the lowest possible level r = y (1 pH)
pH
that just allows the debt-holders to
break-even. Formally, this translates to condition
pH (R  r) < pL (R  r) +B;
5Evidence from the United Statesbanking sector suggests that until recently insurance
premiums collected from banks were either risk-insensitive or virtually non-existent. In
particular, during the 1996-2006 period, majority of the U.S. banks were categorized in
the lowest risk category exempted altogether from the insurance premiums as long as
the insurance fund reserves kept exceeding a prespesied threshold level (Acharya et al.
(2010)).
6In assuming that the nancial intermediary is able to extract all the surplus, the
approach taken here corresponds to that in Carletti et al. (2007), Cerasi and Daltung
(2000) and Freixas et al. (2007). It can be interpreted as reecting scarcity in the ability
to identify protable investment projects.
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where r = y (1 pH)
pH
. This can be rewritten as
B > B  p (pHR + (1  pH)  y)
pH
; (A2)
where p = (pH   pL). Assumption (A2) implies a lower limit on the level
of private benets.
In this setting, the level of fund insurance will have important implications
for the role of supervision by a¤ecting the willingness of debt-holders to
provide funds. In particular, there exists a threshold level of fund insurance,
denoted by , below which paying out the whole cash ow R in case of
success wont be enough to allow the debt-holders to break-even when the
intermediary misbehaves:
pLR + (1  pL)  y < 0;
 <   y   pLR
1  pL : (C1)
Consequently, when  < , simple lending is not feasible. Put di¤erently, it
follows from assumptions (A1) and (A2) that, when  < , the moral hazard
problem of the nancial intermediary prevents funding to take place since the
nancial intermediary will misbehave in which case the debt-holders cannot
expect to break-even.
Suppose now that there exists a party who can monitor the nancial in-
termediary and, consequently, help to reduce the moral hazard problem. For
the purpose of this paper, the debt-holders are assumed to be too dispersed
(or unsophisticated) to e¤ectively monitor the nancial intermediary. In-
stead, this task is assigned to an o¢ cial supervisory authority. In particular,
monitoring allows the supervisory authority to observe the intermediarys
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behavior and to intervene if the intermediary misbehaves.7 Monitoring with
intensitym 2 [0; 1] costs C(m) = 1
2
cm2, wherem corresponds the probability
that the nancial intermediary is made to behave well and c measures the
importance of diseconomies of scale in monitoring. In applying the approach
of Carletti (2004) and Carletti et al. (2007) into the analysis of o¢ cial super-
vision, this convex cost function is meant to reect the idea that it is di¢ cult
for the supervisory authority to nd out more and more about a nancial
intermediary due to the scarcity of skilled personnel or, alternatively, the
negligence of other duties.8
The supervisory authoritys monitoring intensity is unobservable. In
choosing its monitoring intensity, the supervisory authority acts in a cost-
minimizing way; i.e., it is interested in limiting the costs associated with the
intermediarys failure.9 In addition to the fund insurance payout (determined
7By allowing the monitor to intervene and prevent misbehavior, the monitoring tech-
nology is similar to that in Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Holmström and Tirole (1997).
8Alternatively, the diseconomies of scale could be related to the potential costs of
establishing an integrated supervisory authority. In particular, there has been a fear that
supervisory integration may threaten the recognition of industry-specic characteristics
and expertise in supervision through, for instance, the departure of experienced personnel
or because of one agencys approach to supervision becomes overly dominant over that of
the other agency. In a study of integrated supervisory agencies, Martínez and Rose (2003)
found that demoralization of sta¤ and departure of experienced personnel were commonly
encountered in establishing integrated agencies.
9By denition, the cost-minimising supervisory authority is solely concerned about
limiting the downside. Consequently, its choice of monitoring intensity will generally
di¤er from that of a welfare-maximizing supervisor who cares about the aggregate welfare
of the parties and, as a result, also takes into account the upside (for future reference, the
monitoring intensity of the welfare-maximizing supervisor is given in the Appendix). In
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by ), these include social bankruptcy costs denoted by parameter g.10 In-
terestingly, depending on the level of fund insurance, o¢ cial supervision will
now have somewhat di¤erent role. When  < , supervision is necessary for
funding to take place. When  > , supervision is no longer essential for
funding but is still valuable in limiting the social bankruptcy costs and the
fund insurance payout not taken into account by the debt-holders and the
intermediary.
The timing of the model is the following. At date t = 0 the nancial
intermediary collects funds from debt-holders by setting an interest rate r.
The o¤ered interest rate must satisfy the debt-holdersbreak-even condition
and it must be feasible (i.e., it cannot exceed the cash ow of a successful
project). Then the intermediary uses the funds to undertake a project (i.e.,
chooses its behaviour) and the supervisory authority decides how intensively
to monitor the intermediarys project choice.11 At date t = 1 the returns are
realized and the claims are settled.
analyzing a cost-minimising supervisory authority, this paper follows the approach taken
for instance in Mailath and Mester (1994) and Repullo (2001).
10Social bankruptcy costs refer to the negative externalities associated with the interme-
diarys failure (e.g., the e¤ect of bank failure on payment system). They can also capture
the administrative costs of declaring the intermediary bankrupt and closing it down.
11This choice of timing does not a¤ect the results as long as the partiesdecisions are
not observable. The results are a¤ected if a supervisor can commit to a specic monitoring
intensity. For more discussion on this, see the section on "Decentralized supervision".
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3 Monitoring choice and interest rate
In this section, I rst derive the supervisory authoritys choice of monitoring
intensity given the incentive of the intermediary to misbehave in absence of
monitoring. After that, I derive the interest rate o¤ered to the debt-holders
by the intermediary. I also check that the interest rate o¤ered is feasible; i.e.,
that it doesnt exceed the pecuniary return of the project.
The supervisor chooses its monitoring intensity so as to reduce the social
bankruptcy costs and the fund insurance payout associated with the inter-
mediarys failure:
max
m
m [  (1  pH) ( + g)] + (1 m) [  (1  pL) ( + g)]  1
2
cm2: (1)
The interpretation of (1) is the following. Whenever the supervisor succeeds
in monitoring (which happens with the probability m), the nancial inter-
mediary is made to behave well. This then results to the realization of social
bankruptcy costs g and fund insurance payout  only when the intermediarys
project fails; this happens with probability (1  pH). Whenever the super-
visor fails in monitoring (which happens with the probability (1 m)), the
intermediary has incentives to misbehave leading to the realization of bank-
ruptcy costs and fund insurance payout with a higher probability (1  pL).
Solving (1), gives the supervisors choice of monitoring intensity:
m = min

p ( + g)
c
; 1

; (2)
which can also be expressed as
m =
8<: 1 if c  c  p ( + g) ;p(+g)
c
if c > c  p ( + g) :
12
Given that an interior solution obtains, the supervisors monitoring inten-
sity is increasing in the di¤erence in the projects success probabilities, the
extensiveness of the fund insurance coverage and the magnitude of social
bankruptcy costs; the monitoring intensity is decreasing in the cost of moni-
toring (measured by the parameter c). There is a critical level of c, denoted
by c, after which the supervisor monitors with an intensity less than one. If
the cost of monitoring do not exceed this threshold, the supervisor monitors
with an intensity of one.12
Correctly anticipating the supervisors monitoring decision the nancial
intermediary sets at date t = 0 the interest rate r so as to maximize its
expected prot subject to the debt-holders break-even condition and the
contract feasibility condition. This results to an interest rate
r =
y   (1  pH)
pH
; (3)
if the supervisor monitors with an intensity of one, and to
r =
[y   (1  pL)] c+ 2p ( + g)
pLc+ 2p ( + g)
; (4)
if the supervisor monitors with an intensity less than one (for a more detailed
derivation of the interest rates o¤ered, see the Appendix).
The interest rate is feasible, if r  R. When m = 1, this condition is
always met. When m < 1 and the level of fund insurance is low (i.e.,  < ),
the cost of monitoring has to be su¢ ciently low (i.e., c  c  2p(+g)(R )
y pLR (1 pL))
for the supervisor to monitor with high enough intensity to make the required
interest rate feasible; with more generous fund insurance or at intermediate
12How the cost-minimizing supervisors monitoring intensity relates to that of welfare-
maximizing one, see the Appendix.
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levels of monitoring costs (i.e., c 2 [c; c]), the feasibility condition is always
met.13 The following proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 1 When the diseconomies of scale in monitoring are high (i.e.,
c > c), o¢ cial supervision is unable to compensate for low fund insurance in
protecting the interest of the debt-holders; as a result, the nancial interme-
diary is unable to raise funds if  < .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 captures the idea that, from the viewpoint of the debt-holders,
fund insurance and o¢ cial supervision are two alternative instruments to
reduce the riskiness of investment. When fund insurance becomes less gener-
ous, the importance of monitoring increases. However, the level of monitoring
may be insu¢ cient to compensate for a less generous fund insurance if mon-
itoring is very costly. As a result, the nancial intermediary may fail to
raise funding when its behavior is subject to su¢ ciently severe moral hazard
problem.
Proposition 1 suggests that the design of fund insurance policies should
take into account the design and nature of the supervisory framework. Es-
pecially in environments characterized with high costs of o¢ cial supervision
13These results would not qualitatively change under competitive banking sector. In this
case, the interest rate would equal R for all levels of monitoring. As the private benet is
non-transferable, this would leave the intermediary some rents when m < 1 since, due to
limited liability, no-one can end up with negative consumption. Under this scenario, there
could still be situations when the debt-holdersbreak-even condition is violated for m < 1
(i.e., it is possible to nd y so that assumption (A1) holds but the break-even condition is
not met).
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the level of fund insurance becomes critical since a too low level may threaten
the ow of credit to and from nancial intermediaries.
Corollary 2 The design of fund insurance policies should be coordinated with
the design of supervisory framework.
This result implies that in environments where it is not easy for a supervisor
to collect and process information about the intermediaries (e.g., because
of deciencies in the regulatory and legal framework), the coordination of
policies becomes especially important. This is likely to be true for instance
in less well-developed supervisory systems.
The preceding analysis is best suited to describe the supervision of a ho-
mogeneous nancial intermediary like a stand-alone bank or an insurance
company. In the next section, I will extend the basic framework so as to ana-
lyze the supervision of a heterogeneous nancial intermediary which combines
characteristics of two di¤erent stand-alone intermediaries. A natural exam-
ple of a heterogenous nancial intermediary is a nancial conglomerate that
combines banking and insurance under a single roof. In this context, also
the organization of supervision becomes relevant. In particular, in contrast
to the case where only stand-alone nancial intermediaries exist, it matters
whether a single integrated supervisor is in charge of the supervision of nan-
cial intermediaries or whether supervision is decentralized so that in the case
of a nancial conglomerate (at least) two agencies are expected to cooperate
in its supervision.
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4 Monitoring of a nancial conglomerate
In this section, I will rst discuss the denition of a nancial conglomerate.
After that I will derive the monitoring intensity of the supervisory authority
under two alternative supervisory structures: integrated supervision (i.e., a
single supervisor is in charge of supervision) and decentralized supervision
(i.e., two supervisors cooperate in supervision).
In this paper, a nancial conglomerate is taken to be a nancial inter-
mediary that di¤ers from a stand-alone one in two respects. First, instead
of raising the funding from a single class of debt-holders, the nancial con-
glomerate collects the funding in equal proportions from two classes of debt-
holders who di¤er in terms of their fund insurance coverage.14 Formally, this
is captured by denoting the fund insurance coverage by i, i = B; I, where
the subscript B is taken to refer to the banking-part of the conglomerate and
I to the insurance-part. This then implies that, if one unit of outside fund-
ing is needed (and half a unit is collected from each class of debt-holders), a
fraction of funds equal to 1
2
(B + I) is protected in aggregate by the fund
insurance.
Second, the social bankruptcy costs associated with the failure of a -
14For example, debt-holders (i.e., depositors) in banks tend to have access to more
extensive fund insurance than debt-holders in insurance companies. The use of deposit
insurance in banking is typically justied by the desire to avoid costly bank runs. On
the other hand, claims under insurance contracts are generated by the occurrence of a
specied event (exogenous to an economic agent) and, as a result, do not similarly rely
on the debt-holderssense of condence as the withdrawal of bank deposits. The lack of
counterpart to bank runs in insurance tends to lead to less extensive fund insurance (for
more on this, see Rees and Kessner (1999)).
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nancial conglomerate are allowed to di¤er depending on where (i.e., which
part of the intermediary) the failure takes place.15 Formally, this is captured
by denoting the social bankruptcy costs by gi, i = B; I.16 To simplify ex-
pressions I will use Li =
 
1
2
i + gi

, i = B; I, as a shorthand to denote the
failure costs associated with the part i of the conglomerate. Furthermore, to
facilitate the subsequent analysis I will assume that
LB  LI : (A3)
Assumption (A3) means that the failure costs of the banking-arm of the nan-
cial conglomerate are taken to be at least as large as those of the insurance-
arm. This assumption is in line with the general conception that bank failures
are more risky than insurance failures.
Otherwise, the project and debt-holder characteristics are as before. In
particular, the nancial intermediary is still assumed to have access to a
single risky project requiring one unit of outside funding. To ensure that the
nancial conglomerate cannot be given monetary incentives to behave well
(i.e., high enough share of the project cash ow to ensure good behavior),
assumption (A2) is now modied to the following form:
B > B0  p
 
pHR +
1
2
(1  pH) (B + I)  y

pH
: (A2)
15To give an example, the failure of a bank is usually thought to have a larger systemic
e¤ect than the failure of an insurance company because of banks role in the payment
system.
16Alternatively, the parameter gi could be taken to measure the political cost of bank-
ruptcy to the supervisory authority i (for more on this approach, see Kahn and Santos
(2005)).
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Given assumptions (A1) and (A2) and the characterization of the nancial
conglomerate, I will nowmove to analyze the monitoring intensities under two
alternative supervisory structures. I start by analyzing integrated supervision
and then move to decentralized supervision.
4.1 Integrated supervision
Under integrated supervision, a single supervisory authority is in charge of
monitoring the behavior of the nancial conglomerate. Given that the timing
of the model remains the same, the integrated supervisor chooses its moni-
toring intensity so as to reduce the aggregate fund insurance payout and the
aggregate social bankruptcy costs associated with the intermediarys failure:
max
m
m [  (1  pH) (LB + LI)]+(1 m) [  (1  pL) (LB + LI)]  1
2
cm2; (5)
where I have used the expression Li =
 
1
2
i + gi

, i = B; I, as a shorthand
to denote the failure costs associated with the part i of the conglomerate.
The interpretation of equation (5) is the following. Whenever the inte-
grated supervisor succeeds in monitoring (which happens with the probabil-
ity m), the nancial conglomerate is made to choose the good project with
success probability of pH . This then results to the realization of aggregate
social bankruptcy costs and aggregate fund insurance payout only when the
intermediarys project fails; this happens with probability (1  pH). When-
ever the supervisor fails in monitoring (which happens with the probability
(1 m)), the intermediary has incentives to misbehave leading to the realiza-
tion of bankruptcy costs and fund insurance payout with a higher probability
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(1  pL). Solving (5), gives the supervisors choice of monitoring intensity:
m = min

p (LB + LI)
c
; 1

; (6)
which can also be expressed as
m =
8<: 1 if c  c0  p (LB + LI) ;p(LB+LI)
c
if c > c0  p (LB + LI) :
Solving for ri gives
ri =
y   (1  pH)i
pH
;
if the supervisor monitors with an intensity of one, and
ri =
[y   (1  pL)i] c+ 2pi (LB + LI)
pLc+ 2p (LB + LI)
;
if the supervisor monitors with an intensity less than one.
As before, with ungenerous fund insurance (i.e., i < ) the cost of
monitoring has to be su¢ ciently low (i.e., c  c0  2p(LB+LI)(R i)
y pLR (1 pL)i ) for
the supervisor to monitor with high enough intensity to make the required
interest rate feasible. Consequently, the design of fund insurance policies
should be sensitive to the characteristics of the supervisory system so as
to avoid undesired interruptions in the ow of funds to and from nancial
conglomerates.
4.2 Decentralized supervision
In the previous section, a single integrated supervisor was in charge of the
supervision of the nancial conglomerate. Under decentralized supervision,
there are two separate authorities each with the task to minimize the fund
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insurance payout and the social bankruptcy costs of a particular part (sec-
tion) of the conglomerate. In particular, a supervisory authority i is in charge
of minimizing the fund insurance payout to the debt-holders of class i. In
addition, the supervisor i is also in charge of minimizing the social bank-
ruptcy costs associated with the failure in part i of the intermediary. Taken
together, a separate sectoral supervisor is concerned about minimizing the
total failure costs of a particular part of the conglomerate while an integrated
supervisor cares about the total failure costs of the whole conglomerate.
The di¤erence between integrated and decentralized supervision depends
also on how the two sectoral supervisors interact in their monitoring deci-
sions. In what follows, I assume that the two sectoral supervisors choose
their monitoring intensities simultaneously and non-cooperatively by taking
into account that it is su¢ cient for one of them to detect misbehavior in
order to increase the success probability of the whole project.17 As a result,
monitoring essentially delivers a public good from which both the supervi-
sors can benet. The overall monitoring intensity (or detection probability),
denoted by M , becomes
M = 1  (1 mB) (1 mI) :
The supervisor i chooses its monitoring intensity so as to minimize the social
bankruptcy costs and fund insurance payout associated with the debt-holders
17Choosing simultaneous moves does not a¤ect the results as long as a supervisors
choice of monitoring intensity remains unobservable to the other supervisor. The results
are a¤ected if one of the supervisors chooses its monitoring intensity rst, and the other
supervisor can observe it before moving. This case corresponds to a situation where a
supervisor can commit to a specic monitoring intensity.
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of class i:
max
mi
M [  (1  pH)Li] + (1 M) [  (1  pL)Li]  1
2
cm2i . (7)
Expression (7) captures the fact that the two supervisors face an external-
ity in monitoring since the success probability of the project is raised unless
both of them fail in monitoring. In comparison to integrated supervision,
decentralized supervision su¤ers from a free-riding problem (so that an indi-
vidual supervisor may choose to free-ride on the monitoring e¤ort of another
supervisor) but benets from diseconomies of scale in monitoring. The inter-
action of these two e¤ects (captured by M and c, respectively) determines
how the monitoring intensities of the sectoral supervisors relate to that of
the integrated supervisor.
Solving (7), gives the supervisorschoice of monitoring intensity:
mB =
pLB [c pLI ]
c2  2pLBLI
; (8)
mI =
pLI [c pLB]
c2  2pLBLI
: (9)
Using the assumption LB  LI , it is easy to show that:
Proposition 3 When c < pLI , both sectoral supervisors monitor with
positive intensity less than one given by mB and mI in (8) and (9), re-
spectively. When pLI  c < p
p
LBLI , mB = 0 and mI = 1. When
p
p
LBLI < c  pLB, mB = 1 and mI = 0. When c > pLB, both sec-
toral supervisors monitor with positive intensity less than one given by mB
and mI in (8) and (9), respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Proposition 2 highlights several important points. First, at low levels of cost
of monitoring (i.e., c < pLI), the two sectoral supervisors will monitor even
in aggregate less than the integrated supervisor.18 This result follows from
the fact that at low levels of c the diseconomies of scale in monitoring do
not yet benet the two sectoral supervisors su¢ ciently so that they could
overcome their free-riding problem.19
Second, because of the free-riding problem the two sectoral supervisors
may both in turn choose to rely entirely on the monitoring e¤ort of the other
supervisor. This happens at the intermediate levels of cost of monitoring
(i.e., pLI  c  pLB). Despite the free-riding problem, decentralized
supervision will lead (in this region) to equally e¤ective supervision of nan-
cial conglomerates as integrated supervision. In particular, while one of the
supervisors always free-rides on the monitoring e¤ort of the other supervisor,
the two sectoral supervisors are able in aggregate to monitor as e¤ectively as
the integrated supervisor (i.e., M = m = 1 holds in this region).20
18To see this, lets rst rewrite the aggregate monitoring intensity asM = mB+mI mB
mI . The result then follows simply from the observation that M < 1 whenever mB ,
mI < 1.
19In essence, the two supervisors su¤er from a commitment problem since their moni-
toring e¤orts are unobservable. In particular, at low levels of c, neither of the supervisors
can commit not to monitor. Anticipating positive monitoring by the other supervisor
leads both supervisors to reduce their monitoring intensities so that even in aggregate the
sectoral supervisors monitor less than the integrated supervisor.
20At intermediate levels of c one of the supervisors can credibly commit not to monitor.
Simultaneously, the cost of monitoring is still su¢ ciently low so that the other supervisor
has incentive to monitor with full intensity. As a result, the two supervisors monitor in
aggregate as e¤ectively as the integrated supervisor.
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Third, at high levels of cost of monitoring (i.e., c > pLB), the sectoral
supervisors monitor less in aggregate than the integrated supervisor when
pLB < c  p (LB + LI) since (in this region) M < 1 and m = 1. The
high cost of monitoring essentially prevents neither of the supervisors to
monitor with high enough intensity so that the supervisors could overcome
their free-riding problem.
However, when c > p (LB + LI), the analysis is more complicated. Since
both the integrated supervisor as well as the sectoral supervisors monitor
with less than full intensity in this region, the e¤ectiveness of decentralized
supervision as compared to integrated supervision depends on how the overall
monitoring intensity under decentralized supervision
M =
p

(LB + LI) c
3   3pLBLIc2 + 3pL2BL2I
 
c2  2pLBLI
2
relates to the monitoring intensity
m =
p (LB + LI)
c
under integrated supervision. Proposition 3 summarizes the ndings from
the comparison of M and m:
Proposition 4 When the cost of monitoring is at the intermediate level (i.e.,
pLI  c  pLB), the overall monitoring intensity under decentralized su-
pervision equals the monitoring intensity of the integrated supervisor. Other-
wise, integrated supervision leads to higher monitoring intensity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Interestingly, Proposition 3 reveals that contrary to the common belief inte-
grated supervision is not necessarily superior to decentralized supervision in
context of nancial conglomerates:
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Corollary 5 Decentralized supervision can be as e¤ective in supervision of
nancial conglomerates as integrated supervision.
The preceding result suggests that the two supervisory structures could co-
exist in di¤erent countries and deliver similar results in terms of supervisory
intensities and cost and availability of funding for nancial conglomerates.21
In particular, as long as the supervisory structure in question leads to full
monitoring intensity, the debt-holders will require the same interest rate from
the conglomerate independent of its supervisory structure. Otherwise, the
rst instinct suggests that the interest rate o¤ered to the debt-holders should
in general be at least as high under decentralized supervision as under inte-
grated supervision. To see that this is in fact the case, I take the monitoring
intensitiesm andM as given and use the debt-holdersbreak-even conditions
to solve for the required interest rate under integrated and decentralized su-
pervision, respectively:
rinti =
y   (1  pL)i + pim
pL+pm
; (10)
rdeci =
y   (1  pL)i + piM
pL+pM
: (11)
Both (10) and (11) are decreasing with the level of monitoring intensity.
Furthermore, rdeci  rinti if (M  m) (y   i)  0. Since (M  m)  0 and
(y   i) > 0, the debt-holdersdo indeed require at least as high interest rate
21Interestingly, if either the banking or the insurance supervisor could commit not to
monitor for the low values of c (i.e., c  pLI), decentralized supervision would be equally
e¤ective as integrated supervision also in this range. Whether such commitment would
be benecial for the high values of c (i.e., c > pLB) is a more complicated issue and
depends on the parameter constellations of the model.
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from the nancial conglomerate under decentralized supervision as they do
under integrated supervision. However, this does not necessarily mean that
the prot from conglomeration will be lower under sectoral supervision. In
fact, as the following Proposition illustrates, the prot from conglomeration
can be higher under sectoral supervision:
Proposition 6 Despite higher funding costs prot from conglomeration can
be higher under decentralized supervision.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 highlights the fact that from the viewpoint of the nancial
conglomerate monitoring under integrated supervision can be too high in
terms of the private benets that are lost. Although lower monitoring hand-
icaps the nancial conglomerate by leading to a lower success probability of
the project and to a higher interest rate requirement by the debt-holders,
the conglomerate may still benet from sectoral supervision especially if the
private benets are high.
Consequently, nancial conglomerates may be tempted to migrate to envi-
ronments that posit sectoral supervision so as to benet from the potentially
less comprehensive supervision. This in turn implies that harmonization of
the various supervisory structures currently in use in di¤erent countries (e.g.,
in Europe) could be benecial insofar as it helps to ght this tendency. It also
suggests that, in absence of harmonization, ensuring the competitiveness of
nancial sector could help to ght this tendency by limiting the prots (rents)
available from conglomeration. In particular, while not eliminating the dif-
ferences in monitoring intensities, a more competitive nancial sector may
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reduce some unwanted consequences (like opportunistic conglomeration) aris-
ing from the variation in the supervisory structures. Alternatively, one could
of course limit the formation of nancial conglomerates under decentralized
supervision so as to avoid the use of corporate form to escape comprehensive
supervision. Interestingly, this is indeed the policy that the United States
with its highly fragmented supervisory system has followed especially in the
past (for more on this, see Holopainen (2007)).
More generally, the results of this paper are supportive to the recent
trend in Europe to replace the traditional sectorally segregated supervisory
model with a more integrated one. In particular, while integrated supervision
is not necessary for the e¤ective supervision of nancial conglomerates in
all circumstances, it still leads to at least as comprehensive supervision as
decentralized supervision.
Furthermore, the results of this paper highlight the importance of mon-
itoring costs for the comparative e¤ectiveness of the di¤erent supervisory
models and the ow of credit to (and from) nancial intermediaries. In
particular, high cost of monitoring reduces the monitoring incentives of the
supervisors irrespective of the supervisory structure, diminishes the e¤ec-
tiveness of decentralized supervision relative to integrated supervision and
increases the risk of interruptions in the ow of credit to stand-alone -
nancial intermediaries as well as nancial conglomerates. Hence, this paper
suggests that in any supervisory system a high priority should be given to
steps to control these monitoring costs.
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5 Concluding remarks
The recent nancial crisis has intensied the debate about the desirable struc-
ture of nancial supervision in Europe. Despite a trend towards more in-
tegrated nancial supervision over the past decade brought about by the
conglomeration, internationalisation and the blurring of distinctions of the
nancial sector, the existing supervisory structures still exhibit great deal
of heterogeneity both inside and outside Europe. This paper studies the
challenges these varied structures pose on the quality of supervision when
the nancial intermediaries to be overseen include not just stand-alone -
nancial intermediaries but also complex nancial institutions like nancial
conglomerates.
In this paper, nancial conglomeration is important as it conditions the
incentives of the nancial supervisors to exert monitoring e¤ort on the in-
stitutional structure of supervision. In presence of nancial conglomeration,
decentralized supervision su¤ers from the temptation of the supervisors to
free-ride on each others monitoring e¤orts but has simultaneously the poten-
tial to benet from convexities in the cost function. This paper demonstrates
that decentralized supervision can lead to equally e¤ective supervision of -
nancial conglomerates as integrated supervision. However, since the monitor-
ing intensities under integrated and decentralized supervision do not always
coincide, this paper simultaneously shows that decentralized supervision is
vulnerable to the desire of nancial intermediaries to use conglomeration as
a way to escape comprehensive supervision.
The model delivers several empirical implications. First, the design of
fund insurance policies should be coordinated with the design of the super-
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visory framework so as to ensure the ow of credit to and from nancial
intermediaries especially in environments where it is costly to supervisors
to collect and process information about nancial institutions. Second, inte-
grated and decentralized supervision can coexist and be equally e¤ective also
in the supervision of nancial conglomerates. Yet a move towards integrated
supervision is justied in terms of nancial stability (and equal treatment
of nancial intermediaries) since decentralized supervision is vulnerable to
strategic exploitation by nancial intermediaries. Third, the more conserva-
tive approach towards nancial conglomeration traditionally adopted by the
United States may be a reasonable response to its highly fragmented super-
visory system so as to avoid deterioration of supervisory standards. This is
especially true given the argument that, due to the sheer size of its nancial
sector, it is unlikely that o¢ cial supervision of nancial intermediaries will
become fully integrated in the United States. Fourth, in absence of more
harmonized approach in terms of the supervisory structures used, special at-
tention should be paid to controlling the costs of o¢ cial supervision as well
as ensuring the competitiveness of the nancial sector.
More generally, this research outline is concerned with the question of
how to design an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework for -
nancial institutions that, through consolidation, have grown both in size as
well as in complexity. The importance of this question especially for the
nancial system stability has been signicantly facilitated by the recent -
nancial crisis which has fuelled the policy debate on the ability of large -
nancial institutions to receive implicit subsidies through too-big-to-fail or
too-complex-to-fail policies. As some examples of the casualties of the crisis
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(e.g., Fortis) demonstrate, the potential systemic implications of problems
in these institutions are often even more compounded since, in addition to
signicant cross-sectoral activities, they may have extensive cross-border ac-
tivities with varying degrees of signicance in di¤erent countries. Given the
need for supervisory cooperation in these situations, this paper provides one
avenue to analyze the supervisory challenges likely to emerge in context of
complex nancial institutions.
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Appendix:
Monitoring intensity of a welfare-maximizing supervisor:
The monitoring intensity of the welfare-maximizing supervisor is denoted by
mW and is equal to
mW = min

p(R + g) B
c
; 1

:
If B < B  p(R + g), the welfare-maximizing supervisor always monitors
with positive intensity. This condition exceeds the lower limit of private
benets given in assumption (A2), and implies an upper limit on the level of
private benets.
Comparison of monitoring intensities between a welfare-maximizing
and a cost-minimizing supervisor:
How the welfare maximizing supervisors monitoring intensity relates to that
of cost-minimizing one, depends on the level of private benet. When B 2
B;B
0
, where B
0  p (R  ), the monitoring intensity of the cost-
minimizing supervisor equals that of the welfare-maximizing one if c  c
and is lower otherwise. The lower monitoring intensity for c > c results from
the fact that the cost-minimizing supervisor does not take into account the
positive e¤ect of its monitoring e¤ort on the pecuniary returns generated.
When B 2

B
0
; B

, the monitoring intensities are the same if c  c; oth-
erwise, the cost-minimizing supervisor monitors with higher intensity than
the welfare-maximizing one since the former does not take into account the
negative e¤ect of its monitoring e¤ort on the private benets generated.
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Derivation of the nancial intermediarys interest rate o¤er at
date t = 0:
Given the supervisors monitoring intensity m = min
n
p(+g)
c
; 1
o
, the -
nancial intermediary sets at date t = 0 the interest rate r so as to maximize
its expected prot subject to the debt-holdersbreak-even condition and the
contract feasibility condition:
max
r
mpH (R  r) + (1 m) [pL (R  r) +B] ;
s.t. m [pHr + (1  pH)] + (1 m) [pLr + (1  pL)]  y = 0;
r  R:
Insertingm = 1 andm = p(+g)
c
into the debt-holdersbreak-even condition
gives the interest rates in (3) and (4), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The interest rate o¤ered to the debt-holders must not exceed the pecuniary
return of the successful project: r  R. When the supervisor monitors with
full intensity, this condition is always met. When the supervisor monitors
with an intensity less than one, equation (4) gives the relevant condition:
 c [y   pLR  (1  pL)] + 2p ( + g) [R  ]  0:
The rst term in the square brackets is positive only if  < . In this case,
c  c  2p(+g)(R )
y pLR (1 pL) has to hold for the interest rate to be feasible.
Proof of Proposition 2:
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Given LB  LI , the results stated in the Proposition 2 follow simply from
a comparison of the signs of the numerator and the denominator of mB =
pLB [c pLI ]
c2 2pLBLI and mI =
pLI [c pLB ]
c2 2pLBLI . For mi to be positive it necessitates
that either both the numerator and the denominator are negative or both
of them are positive. Applying this criterion gives the relevant regions for
comparison (c < pLI , pLI  c < p
p
LBLI , p
p
LBLI < c  pLB and
c > pLB) and the corresponding monitoring intensities.
Proof of Proposition 3:
When c > c0  p (LB + LI), the monitoring intensity under integrated
supervision is given by
m =
p (LB + LI)
c
:
On the other hand, the overall monitoring intensity under decentralized
supervision is M = mB+ mI   mB mI , where mB = pLB [c pLI ]c2 2pLBLI and
mI =
pLI [c pLB ]
c2 2pLBLI . Substituting the values of mB and mI into the equa-
tion for M gives
M =
p

(LB + LI) c
3   3pLBLIc2 + 3pL2BL2I
 
c2  2pLBLI
2 :
The latter exceeds the former only if
3c3   2p (LB + LI) c2  2pLBLIc+ 3pLBLI (LB + LI) < 0:
Dening f(c)  3c3 2p (LB + LI) c2 2pLBLIc+ 3pLBLI (LB + LI) and
taking the rst derivative of f(c) gives f 0(c1) = 0 and f 0(c2) = 0, where
c1 =
4p (LB + LI) 
q
162p (L
2
B + L
2
I) + 68
2
pLBLI
18
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and
c2 =
4p (LB + LI) +
q
162p (L
2
B + L
2
I) + 68
2
pLBLI
18
:
Both of these are smaller than c0 = p (LB + LI).
Taking the second derivative of f(c) and inserting the values c1 and c2
into f 00(c) shows that f 00(c1) < 0 and f 00(c2) > 0. Consequently, the value
of the function f(c) at c1, f(c1), is a relative maximum and at c2, f(c2), a
relative minimum. Since c2 < c0 = p (LB + LI) and f(c) at c0, f(c0) > 0,
the function f(c) = 3c3  2p (LB + LI) c2 2pLBLIc+ 3pLBLI (LB + LI)
will be positive for all c > p (LB + LI). A a result, the sectoral supervisors
will monitor even in aggregate less than the integrated supervisor when c >
p (LB + LI).
Proof of Proposition 4:
Given m, M , rinti and r
dec
i , the prots from conglomeration under integrated
and decentralized supervision, respectively, are
int = mpH

R  1
2
rintB  
1
2
rintI

+ (1 m)

pL

R  1
2
rintB  
1
2
rintI

+B

dec = MpH

R  1
2
rdecB  
1
2
rdecI

+(1 M)

pL

R  1
2
rdecB  
1
2
rdecI

+B

:
After rearranging the terms, it follows that dec > int, if
(m M) (B  pR)  1
2

p

Mdec  mint+ pL dec   int	 > 0;
(A.1)
where dec  rdecB + rdecI and int  rintB + rintI . After some calculations one
can show that the term  1
2
fg on the left-hand side of (A.1) reduces to
(m M) p (B + I)

p2L + (m+M) pLp +mM
2
p

2 (pL + pm) (pL + pM)
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which is positive. Then, if B > pR, it is immediately clear that the ex-
pression in (A.1) is positive since the rst term on the left-hand side is also
positive. Since B > pR does not violate previous assumptions concerning
B, the prot from conglomeration can be higher under decentralized super-
vision.
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